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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON J. HACKFORD, SHARON
)
HACKFORD, RANDOLPH J. HACKFORD,)
and SANDRA H. ASAY,
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.
ALBERT LEO SNOW and CORWIN
BARTON SNOW,
Defendants/Respondents,
and
ALBERT LEO SNOW,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 17067

Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, )
v.
CLIFTON J. HACKFORD, et al.,
Defendants/CrossRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS AND
PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents (hereinafter "Snows") filed an action
seeking specific performance of an option to purchase giveento Snows by Appellants (hereinafter "Hackfords") and damag-ges
for forcible entry.

Hackfords then filed an action to

hav~e

Snows evicted and the lease and option to purchase cancelJled.
The two cases were consolidated for trial by the trial
court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court which found that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agreement between the parties was valid and enforceable, and
that the Snows had properly exercised the option to purchase
on July 15, 1977, and were entitled to decree of specific
performance.

The Court held that since the agreement between

the parties contained no express provision allowing the
lease to be terminated for_ breach of_ its_ 1:erms, _that _the
proper procedure for terminating the lease was that set
forth in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute of the
State of Utah.

Since the Hackfords did not institute pro-

ceedings under that statute until two months -after the Snows
had properly noticed the exercise of their option to purchase, the lease and option were in effect at the time of
the exercise of the option. Furthermore, the acts complained
as breaches of the lease by-the Hackfords as justification
for-termination of the lease were not sufficient to terminate the -lease.

The court further-found that the Snows

suffered damages as a result_ of- the __ Hackfords' attempts to
use self-help methods in evicting the Snows during 1977 and
1978 but refused to treble those damages.

The court also

refused to award attorney fees and costs as provided in the
agreement between the parties.

The Hackfords' claim for

unlawful detainer and to have the lease and option to purchase cancelled was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Snows seek to have this Court affirm the trial court's
decision awarding them specific performance and to remand
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the case with instructions to treble the damages awarded to
Snows as a result of Hackfords' self-help actions and to
award Snows their costs and attorney fees incurred, including those incurred on this appeal.
PARTY DESIGNATIONS IN BRIEF
This case involves the consolidation of two cases at
the lower court.

Also, the trial court bifurcated the trial

holding a separate hearing on the issue of damages.

To

avoid confusion at the trial court, the Appellants' were
referred to as Defendants and the Respondents as Plaintiffs.
Appellants' brief now refers to the Appellants as the Plaintiffs.

To avoid confusion, the Respondents will be referred

to as "Snows" and the Appellants as "Hackfords" in this
brief.

Since the transcripts of the trial consists of two

volumes as a result of the bifurcated trial and the transcripts are by two different reporters, the transcript of
the trial held on November 30, 1978, transcribed by Edward
Quist will be referred to herein as "Q.T."

The transcript

of the trial on October 26, 1979, transcribed by Neil Cooley
will be referred to herein as "C.T."
referred to as "R."

The Court file will be

Exhibits will be referred to as "Ex."

Respondents controvert the alleged statement of facts
submitted by Appellants in that it consists mainly of the
testimony of Clifton J. Hackford which testimony was not
supported by the other witnesses and was not believed by the
Court.

The statement of facts in Hackfords' brief is not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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consistent with the trial court's findings of fact and many
pages of the alleged facts are immaterial to the issues on
appeal.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 75(p)2 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Respondents submit the following statement of facts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 15, 1975, Corwin Barton Snow, acting on behalf
of himself and his brother, Albert Leo Snow, and Clifton J.
Hackford, acting on behalf of himself and the other Appellants, entered into an agreement whereby the Hackfords
agreed to lease to the Snows the Hackfords' property with an
option to the Snows to purchase the property during the term
bf the lease. (Ex. 1)

Hackfords indicated that they desired

to retain the acreage whereon Clifton J. Hackford's house
was located and approximately 20 acres contiguous to that
house.

Clifton J. ·Hackford, Corwin Barton Snow and a real

estate agent who was with them, Sherman Culp, walked over
the property and Clifton Hackford pointed out to the parties
the 20 acres to be retained by Hackfords to be used for a
horse pasture. (Q.T. 38-41,47,52,54)

After reviewing the

agreement with the parties, the real estate agent, Sherman
Culp, reduced the parties agreement to writing.

That agree-

ment was then signed by the Hackfords and by the Snows. (Ex.
1,4)

(A copy of that agreement is included as Appendix A to

this brief.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The agreement entered into by the parties provided that
the Snows would pay the Hackfords as a lease payment $4,000.00
per year for a three (3) year period running from May 1,

1975, through April 30, 1978.

The agreement also provided

Snows with an option to purchase the property.

The terms of

the option were as follows:
Option to Purchase as follows: During three year
period, May 1, 1975 to May 1, 1978. Selling price
of $94,500.00 for 420 acres is agreed. Downpayment
in year purchase will equal 29% of sale price.
Balance financed at 7% of unpaid amounts per year
paid monthly. Principal will be reduced in 15
equal installments beginning 1 January of year
following purchase. Lease payments will apply to
the downpayment as follows: exercised in 6 months
or less, $2,000.00 to apply -- 7 months to 1 year,
$1,000.00 will apply. This time element will
apply from 1 May of each year, lease/option to
purchase is in effect and $4,000.00 lease has been
paid. (Ex. 1, lines 18-22,33,34)
All water shares and 1/3 of the oil/mineral rights
will be transferred with the sale of property to
buyers, subject to the payment of the property
contract balance.. (Ex. 1, lines 16, 17)
The real property subject to the lease and the option to
purchase was described as:
[R]eal property situated at: Neola (420 acre,
Hackford Ranch), Uintah County, State of Utah.
(Ex. 1, lines 4,5)
The agreement also provided that if either party.failed to
comply with or carry out the terms and conditions of the
agreement, the defaulting party would pay all expenses of
enforcing the agreement or any rights arising out of the
breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. (Ex.
1 and Appendix A to this brief, lines 44-47)

The agreement

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did not contain any provision for terminating the lease in
the event of a breach by the lessees.
There is no disagreement between the parties as to
where the 420 acre Hackford Ranch is located. (Q.T. 12-13;
Ex. 3)

The Hackfords admitted that they owned not more than

445 acres of which 420 acres was the acreage that was
leased to the Snows with an option to purchase.
17, 30,261,273-279)

(Q.T. 12-

At the time the lease was signed Hackfords

were involved in a partition action, Pumpers, Inc. v. Hackford,
the conclusion of which gave Hackfords an additional 8
acres which-the -trial court held were not subject to the
option to purchase. (R. 242)
The $4,000.00 lease payment was paid each year for
1975, 1976 and 1977 and accepted by the Hackfords as provided by the lease. (Q.T. 18)

The Snows entered upon the

land, farmed those areas suitable for cultivation, and
grazed the remainder of the property, much of which consists
of a river, rocks and brush.

The water assessments and

property taxes were also paid by the Snows.

At times, those

payments were late, but the Snows did see that the payments
were made and.paid any penalties or interest.

At no time

was any interest of the Hackfords forfeited due to late
payment. (Ex. 9; Q.T. 240)

During 1975 and 1976, the Snows

farmed all of the property except for the fenced area around
Clifton J. Hackford's house.

Pursuant to oral_ agreement

between the parties, the hay cut from the 20 acres contiguous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to the house which was being retained by the Hackfords, was
baled by Snows and then delivered to Hackfords to feed their
horses. (Finding of Fact 13; R. 243)

With the consent and

approval of Hackfords, Snows dug a silage pit on the property and levelled the property for the future construction
of corrals. (Q.T. 207,243,274)

The Hackfords during that

time, exercised control over the 20 acres contiguous to
Clifton J. Hackford's house.

They planted a garden, received

the hay from that area to feed their horses and Randy Hackford built a structure on that 20 acres and fenced it with
the understanding that those lands would remain the property
of the family.

(Q.T. 118,124,126)

In January of 1977, Albert Leo Snow contacted Clifton
J. Hackford and informed him that he desired to exercise the
option and to purchase the property.

Clifton J. Hackford

informed Albert Leo Snow that was agreeable and he would see
that the paperwork was prepared. (Q.T. 223,245)

On

January

25, 1977, Flying Diamond Oil Company entered into an oil and
gas lease with the Hackfords which lease covered certain of
the properties subject to the lease and option to purchase
with the Snows. (Q.T. 101; Ex. 12)

In April of 1977, Flying

Diamond Oil Company, pursuant to the terms of the oil and
gas lease, located and drilled an oil well in the Southeast
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 1
South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special !1eridian.

The well was

located some distance south and east from the Hackford house
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in an alfalfa field which had been farmed by the Snows under
the lease for the preceding two years. (Q.T. 100-102)

At

no time prior to the construction of that well did the
Hackfords make any claim that they intended to retain that
20 acres rather than 20 acres contiguous to their house.
In May of 1977, Snows paid to Hackfords and Hackfords
accepted the $4,000.00 lease payment for the May, 1977 to
April, 1978 lease term.

On July 7, 1977, the Hackfords had

their attorney write a letter to Albert Leo Snow advising
him that the "Lease and option to purchase are hereby cancelled." (Ex. 11)

On receipt of that letter, Albert Leo

Snow and his attorney, John C. Beaslin, met with Clifton J.
Hackford and informed Hackfords that they intended to remain
the full term of the lease and that the Snows were exercising
the option to purchase the property.

The Hackfords were

informed that the Snows were ready, willing and able to pay
the purchase price, either in full or pursuant to the terms
of the earnest money agreement. (Q.T. 297-300)

The meeting

was confirmed by letter dated July 15, 1977, again informing
Hackfords that the Snows were exercising the option to
purchase. (Ex. 2)

The Snows continued to farm the land as

they had the preceding two years. Two months,later on September 27, 1977, the Hackfords served the Snows with a document
entitled Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement and Notice
of Eviction and Requirement to Vacate Premises Within Three
Days.

That document stated that "the earnest money receipt
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and offer to lease, dated April 15, 1975, is hereby terminated
and cancelled this date. [September 27, 1977]." (Ex. 17)
The date of the notice which claimed to be the effective
date of the cancellation was more than two months after the
exercise of the option by Snows.

Upon receipt of that

document, the Snows filed Civil No. 9558 seeking enforcement
of the option to purchase. (R. 50)

Hackfords answered the

complaint on October 27, 1977. (R. 54)

Months later, on

February 6, 1978, the Hackfords filed Civil No. 9728 seeking
to have the Court declare the lease and option to purchase
terminated and to find that the Snows were unlawful detainers
on the basis of the September 27, 1977, notice. (R. 1)
After the filing of the two lawsuits in the spring of
1978, a dispute arose as to which party should have possession
of the lands-involved.

The trial court, after a hearing,

entered an order allowing Snows to remain in possession. (R.
91-92)
evict

The Hackfords then resorted to Be1£-help actions to
~the

Snows. (Q.T. 187)

Those actions included turning

the Snows' cattle out on the public road, (C.T. 78-81),
removing hay and fences, (C.T. 25-35,46-52), locking the
gates and blocking the entrance to the property, (C.T. 5761; Q.T. 115,177-184), and by false representations having
the Uintah County Sheriff's Department issue a citation for
trespass. (Q.T. 90)

The court, after hearing the testimony,

also viewed the property and then entered its decree.
(C.T. 16-17)
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POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. HAD NOT BEEN
TERMINATED AT THE TIME SNOWS EXERCISED
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE INCLUDED IN THE
LEASE BECAUSE THE LEASE DID NOT CONTAIN
A FORFEITURE PROVISION, THE LEASE HAD
NOT OTHERWISE BEEN FORFEITED AND ANY
ALLEGED BREACHES WERE INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY A FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE.

It is a general rule of real property law that if a
le-ase does not have a forfetture

provisiorr-whi-ch~

sets· -forth --

the procedure to follow in the event of a breach, the
lessor's remedy is to sue for damages.

Browns Administra-

tors v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Buchannan v. Crites, 150
P.2d 100 (1944); Western Rebuilders v. Felmly, 391 P.2d 383
(Or. 1964); Thompson v. Harris, 452 P.2d 122 (Ariz. 1969);
Shultz v. Raney, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 941 (1958); Jennings
v. Amend, 101 Kan. 130, 165 P. 845 (1917); 49 Am.Jur.2d,
Landlord and Tenant, §1020.
As an additional remedy, most jurisdictions have enacted statutes which set forth the procedure by which a
landlord can get a court order declaring-the lease £orfeited.
However, that procedure must be strictly complied with
before the lease is forfeited.

Carstensen v. Hansen, 107

U. 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944); Browns Administrators v. Bragg,
supra, J. Krasnowicki, Ownership and Development of Land,
1965, at 177.

(A copy of the Bragg case and the notes

following it are attached to Snows' memorandum, R. 191)
The State of Utah has adopted a statutory procedure which
allows a landlord to obtain a court order declaring the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

lease forfeited when the lease does not contain an express
provision terminating the lease.

That statute is the Forcible

Entry and Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1, et ~
The provisions of that statute must be strictly complied
with before the court will grant an order terminating a
lease.

Van Zyverden v. Farrar,___15 Ut. 2d 36 7, 393 P. 2d 468

(1964).

Even if the statute is followed or if the lease

contains a forfeiture provision, the courts are reluctant to
forfeit a lease for minor breaches if the forfeiture would
cause the parties to loose their investment.

Perkins v.

Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); School District
Re-20 v. Panucci, 490 P.2d 711 (Col. 1971).
The Hackfords at trial and on appeal have maintained
that the lease in question should be terminated for failure
by the lessee to timely pay the property taxes as required
by the lease.

The Hackfords have failed to comprehend that

the law only allows a lease to be forf,eited without a court
order, if the terms of the lease provide a procedure by
which the lease can be forfeited.

If the lease does not

provide a procedure by which the lease is terminated, then
the parties seeking to terminate the lease must strictly
follow the provisions of the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statute and the lease is then only cancelled when the Court,
after a hearing, enters its order forfeiting the lease.
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.

The cases cited by the Hackfords,
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in support of their position that leases may be terminated
by notice, discuss leases or other-agreements in which there
are express provisions setting forth the procedure by which
the landlord may terminate the lease in accordance with the
agreed upon termination clause.

In each case, the court

carefully_ considered the procedure ...set. £or.th _in .the_ ..agree-_
ment and if the lessor had strictly followed the lease
provisions, then the forfeiture of the lease was upheld.
None of the cases cited by the Hackfords involved an agreement or lease without a provision authorizing the lessor to
terminate the lease in the event of default. Therefore, the
issue before this Court was not considered in those cases.
The Hackfords have argued that the Snows breached the
lease by failure to pay the 1977 water assessment when due,
and for late payment of previous years property taxes.

The

lease between theparties contains no provision setting
forth how the lease is to be forfeited because of the failure to timely pay the water assessments.

The language the

Hackfords cite at page 24 of their brief for a forfeiture
provision is not a forfeiture provision and has no relationship to the breach of any covenant to pay the property tax
or water assessments.

It is a provision providing that in

the event the tenant failed to execute a future agreement
between the parties, then any earnest money could be retained
by the lessor as liquidated damages. (Ex. 1, lines 39-40)
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The Hackfords, at trial, argued that they unilaterally
cancelled the lease when they had a local a~torney mail a
letter to the Snows on July 7, 1977. (Ex. 11)

That letter

was not properly served, it did not give the Snows the
alternative to cure any breach, or otherwise comply with the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(5).

The Hackfords

did not follow up on that letter to seek a court declaration
that the lease be forfeited.

Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.

The

Hackfords, by their unilateral act of mailing a letter to
Snows, could not cancel the lease.

The Hackfords acknowl-

edged that the letter did not effect a cancellation of the
lease when two months later, on September 27, 1977, they
served the Snows with a notice to evict.

By that notice,

they abandoned the claim that the prior letter cancelled the
lease and stated that the lease was terminated as of the
date of the notice.

A complaint seeking treble .damages and

to have the lease forfeited as of September 27, 1977, was
then·filed in October, 1977. (R. 1-4)

No mention was made

in Hackfords' complaint of the first letter sent by Mr.
Colton.
Two months prior to the date of the eviction notice,
the Snows had exercised their option to purchase the property by letter dated July 15, 1977, and had informed the
Hackfords that they were ready, willing and able to pay the
full purchase price.

The trial court found that the letter

of July 15, 1977, was a valid exercise of the option to
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purchase which finding the Hackfords have not disputed.
(Finding of Yact 4; R. 241)

Since the Snows had exercised

their option to purchase and had tendered the purchase price
two months before the Hackfords cotmnenced action to have the
lease forfeited, the trial court correctly held that the
lease,had··not··been· forfeit-ed·-at-··-the·time -of

·the-~-exercise--of- ·

the option. (Finding of Fact 7; R. 245)
The trial court also found that the alleged breaches by
the Snows for late payment of taxes or water assessments
were insufficient grounds to terminate the lease, even if
the Hackfords had followed the proper procedure to have a
court terminate the agreement. (Finding of Fact 9; R. 242)
Also, the court did not find that Snows breached the lease
for. failure to maintain -ditches or. _fences..

These__~findings -

are supported by the evidence that the Hackfords had accepted the $4,000..-00 lease.payment from the -Snows in May of1977' had o~cured .all

al~leged

breaches befora--the notice to

evict was served, and none of the alleged breaches caused
any damage to Hackfords.
The trial court properly decided that the letter of
July 7, 1977, did not cancel the lease, that the eviction
notice served September 27, 1977, could not cancel the lease
because the Snows had previously exercised the option to
purchase and, even if the Hackfords had properly pursued an
action to obtain a forfeiture of the lease, the alleged
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breaches by the Snows were non-existent or insufficient to
declare a forfeiture of the lease.
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POINT II. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WAS THE APPROPRIATE
REMEDY WHEN HACKFORDS REFUSED TO COMPLY
- WITH THE TERMS. OF THE WRITTEN OPTION TO
PURCHASE AFTER SNOWS PROPERLY EXERCISED
THAT OPTION, HAD PAID THE LEASE PAYMENTS
AND HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND
FOR THREE YEARS UNDER THE LEASE WITH THE
OPTION TO PURCHASE.
This Court recently reiterated the standard to be
applied .in deciding whether to grant specific performance of
land contracts when one party claims the terms of the contract are not sufficiently definite. The Court stated that:
Before specific performance will be employed by
the courts to enforce a contract, the terms of the
agreement-must be reasonably certain so that the
parties know what is required of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the
intent of the contracting parties. In reviewing
the written agreement evidencing the contract, and
any ambiguity inherent in the language used,
extrinsic evidence -may be ceonsidered by the court
to..del·ineate :the~ intent oL_the parties and the
enforceability-of the contract. Thus, courts are
provided a means by which they can look beyond the
terms found in the written agreement to ascertain
the intent of the contracting·parti·es. If from
this-examinati.on of the ~transaction the courts
determinec-the ·actuaL_contract--is certain and--the
obligation and rights of the parties defined, then
they may employ their equitable powers to enforce
the contract via specific performance. Reed v.
Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ut. 1980).
In Reed v. Alvey, the agreement provided that the
plaintiff was purchasing real property described as "corner
of Hillville and Ninth East."

The trial court ruled that

the description was too vague and incomplete and denied
specific performance.

This Court reversed stating that the

extrinsic evidence presented by the plaintiff concerning the
transaction defined the property in sufficient detail to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

support specific performance.
In Stauffer v. Call, 589 P.2d 1219 (Ut. 1979), the
parties had entered into an agreement for the purchase of
real property.

The property was described as:

[T]wo houses using the natural boundaries, sic,
which is approximately 10 acres collectively plus
approximately, sic, 1/5 water rights. Calls to
retain the fencecr-natural farm ground on the SE
which is approximately 40 acres PLUS 2/5 water
rights. The remaining ground southeast of the old
highway to be Stauffers, along with the two houses.
Id., 1220.
~

After the agreement was executed, the parties attempted to
agree on the description of the land sold.

During that

time, the buyers occupied and possessed the land and made
improvements on the houses.

The trial court received parole

evidence as to the intent of the parties and then entered
its order denying -specific performance, finding.that the
description was not sufficient to allow specific performance.
This Court reversed finding that to deny specific performance
would be to grant

to·the··sellers~a

"mighty windfall" due to

the enhanced value of the property and ordered the trial
court to take testimony as to what was said and done as it
related to the description of the property and then to
decide the legal description of the land.
In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Ut. 1980), the
defendant had contended that the earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase was unenforceable due to ambiguities in
the description of the property.

The trial court received

parole Sponsored
evidence
relating to the description of the property
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and granted specific performance.

This Court affirmed that

decision holding that if the trial court finds that "the
terms of the contract were sufficiently complete and clear
to justify a decree of specific performance, its judgment
will stand if it has substantial support in the records."
Id. 1 429.
In the present case, the trial court found that:
The reciting of the number of acres involved,
i.e., 420 acres, the recitation of the property
being in Uintah County, Utah, the description of
the property as the "Hackford Ranch," the occupancy and farming of the acreage by the plaintiffs and the receipt of all lease monies by the
defendants for the three (3) years of the lease,
which lease monies defendants made no attempt to
return, memorialize the description of the 420
subject to the terms of the option to purchase and
the agreement of the parties. (Finding of Fact 7;
R. 242)
The trial cou:r-t

~further_

found that the 20- acres_ retained by

the Hackfords was the area southwest of the house of Clifton
J. Hackfo:t'd which included the-_horse--pasture and out build-

ing constructed by the-Hackfords.

The-Court-held that the

actions of the Snows in delivering hay from the 20 acres
next to Clifton Hackford's house together with the approval
of the Hackfords of the location of the silage pit, the
construction of an out building by the Defendants on the
property contiguous to Clifton Hackford's house, and all
other evidence affirmed that the 20 acres retained by
Hackfords was the 20 acres located next to Clifton Hackford's house. (Findings of Fact 12 and 13; R. 243)
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The present case is also similar to Brady v. Fausett,
546 P.2d 246 (Ut. 1976).

In Brady v. Fausett, the property

subject to the lease and option to purchase was described as
real property located in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties,
Colorado.

This Court sustained the trial court's granting

of specific performance stating that the acceptance by the
seller of monies pursuant to the contract, none of which was
ever refunded, and the buyer's occupancy, operation of and
improvement of the properties memorialized the descriptions
of the property.

In the present case, the Hackfords have

accepted the lease payments including the payment made in
May of 1977, and the Snows possessed the property for three
years, farmed and pastured the property, built a silage pit
and prepared

an,area~-for

corrals.

The Hackfords, on the

area -they retained, raised a garden, built an additional out
building and _fenced part of it, as well as obtained the hay
from that acreage. Those actions sustain and support the
testimony of the real estate agent, Sherman Culp, and the
Snows that at the time the agreement was entered into, the
Hackfords owned at least 440 acres of which they desired to
lease and grant an option to purchase to the Snows for 420
acres, retaining to themselves, the house and 20 acres
contiguous thereto.

Settlement of the Pumpers, Inc. case

eventually gave the Hackfords an additional 8 acres bringing
their total acreage to 448 acres.

The 448 acres was the
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only property owned by Hackfords.
The Hackfords reliance on the cases of Davison v. Robbins,
517 P.2d 1026 (Ut. 1973); and, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423
P.2d 491 (1967), is misplaced.

In Davison v. Robbins, the

court refused to grant specific performance because the
earnest money receipt was only an agreement to agree in tlhat
the parties agreed that at some later date the seller wouJld
decide which acres to sell and then the buyer had a right- ·to
refuse that offer.

In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, the court

refused specific performance holding that the parties ha&
abandoned the contract. The court also indicated that the·
description was insufficient since the property to be solcii
was designated on a map which was to be attached, which maap
was not produced at trial.
At the time the-Snows

~nd

Hackfords signed the earneg;t

money receipt and off er to lease there was no uncertainty· as
to what property was to-be subject to the lease and the
option to purchase.

The parties, with Mr. Culp, the realtt.or?

walked over the property and Mr. Hackford indicated to Mr ..
Culp what property the Hackfords desired to retain and wha1t
property was to be leased by the Snows. (Q.T. 38-41) The
earnest money receipt and option to purchase was then prepared and signed by the parties and the Snows entered intoo
possession of the property.

During 1975 and 1976, feelinggs

between the parties were amicable. The Snows farmed those
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parts of the property which were subject to cultivation and
grazed livestock on the remainder.

On the acreage the

Hackfords were retaining, they planted a garden, received
the hay therefrom for their horses, built an outbuilding and
fenced part of it.

In the winter and spring of 1977, Flying

Diamond Oi 1 Co. .obtained a lease £rom the. Hackfords .and then
drilled an oil well on part of the property being fanned by
the Snows.

The Snows paid the rent for the lease term

running from May, 1977, to April of 1978 which was accepted
and retained by Hackfords.

Then in the summer of 1977, the

Hackfords changed their minds and decided that instead of
the acreage by the house, they desired to retain the 20
acres where the oil well was located.

Pursuant to that

unilateral change of mind, the Hackfords attempted to take
possession of the 20 acres.

When they were unsuccessful,

they then attempted to terminate the lease and option to
purchase claiming that the description was not sufficient.
This Court in its recent decisions has manifested its
intent to enforce agreements between the parties especially
when the seller, who is attempting to have .a court of equity
void its agreement, will receive a windfall from the increased value of the land, or in this case, development of
the oil rights.

There was no uncertainty at the time the

agreement was entered into by the parties and the actions of
the parties support and confirm that agreement and that
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finding by the trial court.

It was the mind of the Hackfords

that changed when the oil well was drilled rather than the
terms of the agreement.

This was recognized by the trial

court which properly exercised its equitable powers in
granting specific performance for the Snows.

j

·~·
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
TREBLE THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO SNOWS AS RE~UIRED BY ST TUTE AS A RESULT OF HACKFORDS'
ORCIBLE ENTRY ON THE LANDS POSSESSED BY
SNOWS.
Utah's Forcible Entry Statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1,
provides that:
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who
either:
(1) By breaking open doors, windows or other parts
of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth,
or by any kind of violence or circumstances of
terror enters upon or into any real property; or
(2) After entering peaceably upon real property,
turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct
the-party in actual possession.
The Forcible Entry Statute was enacted for the purpose
of preventing disturbances of the peace by self-help actions
of landlords or other persons -attempting to evict parties in
possession -:-of property.

Buchannan--v .-- Crites,- 106 Ut. 428,

150-P.2d 100 (1944); King v. Firm, 3 Ut.2d 419, 285 P.2d
1114 (1955).

In determining whether the defendant was

guilty of forcible entry, the _court- in Freeway Park Bldg.,
Inc. v; Wes-tern St-ates Hot:eL-5upply ,-- 22 Ut .-'2d 266, 45T P .-2d
778, stated that:
Everyone is guilty of a forcible entry who conmits
the acts specified. All that an occupant needs to
show in order to be protected against self-help
eviction is to show that he was in peaceful
possession of the land within five (5) days prior
to the unlawful entry. If this is shown by a
tenant in possession, the one entitled thereto
must secure his rights under the statute; and if
he- takes the law into his own hands and turns a
tenant in peaceful possession out by means of
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force, fraud, intimidation, stealth or by any kind
of violence, he makes himself liable to that
tenant for damag~s. 451 P.2d at 781.
The removal of the doors -from the premises, the changing of
the locks on the tenant's door or the removal of the tenant
from his business office pursuant to a writ of attachment
have all been held to be acts which constitute forcible
entry.

Peterson v. Platt, 16 Ut.2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965),

Buchannan v. Crites, supra, Freeway Park Bldg., -Inc. v.
Western States Wholesale Supply, supra, and King v. Firm,
supra.

A finding by the court that the action of the de-

fendant constituted forcible entry "[M]akes it ·mandatory
upon the court to render judgment for three times the amount
of the damages thus assessed."

Forrester v. Cook, 77 Ut.

137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
The trial court found that Snows were in lawful possession of the property at all times during the proceedings.
(R. 238,244)

Furthermore, the trial court had entered an

order allowing Snows to remain in temporary possession of
the property.

(R. 91-92)

While Snows were in peaceful

possession of the property, Hackfords attempted several
times to evict Snows by self-help methods.

Hackfords used

those self-help methods even though they were fully aware of
the Order granting possession of the property to Snows.

(Q.T. 187)

Hackfords, in attempting to evict Snows, turned

Snows' cows out onto a public road, (C.T. 78-81), removed
hay belonging to Snows, (C.T. 46-52), removed fences from
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the property, (C.T. 25-35), and by false representations had
a Uintah County Sheriff's Deputy issue a ticket to an employee
of Snows working on the property. (Q.T. 90)

In addition to

destroying and removing property belonging to Snows, Hackfords
locked the gate on the entranceway to the property, (C.T.
57-61; Q.T. 115, 177, 184), . and .blocked_ the. entrance -to. the .
property with their truck. (Q.T. 178-184)

Hackfords further

admitted at trial that they had prevented Snows from entering on the property despite instructions from the officers
of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department that they were not
to interfere with Snows' possession of the property. (Q.T.
89-90)
Even though the Snows were in peaceful possession of
the property at all times ·and the court awarded Snows judgment for the damages they_haa suffered as a result of the
unlawful actions of Hackfords, (R. 238,244), the trial
court, refused to treble the .damages as required-by Utah
Code Ann. §78-36-10 holding that the_conduct of Hackfords
did not violate the provisions of the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute. _(R. _238, 247)

Snows assert, as stated in

Freeway Park, supra, that any time a party commits any of
the acts specified in Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1, that party is
guilty of forcible entry.

This Court has held that replac-

ing a lock on a door or otherwise blocking the entrance to
any real property is forcible entry.

King v. Firm, _supra;
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Peterson v. Platt, supra.

The self-help actions on the part

of Hackfords fall squarely within the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §78-36-1 making Hackfords guilty of forcible
entry.

Since Hackfords' unlawful actions caused damages to

Snows, it was mandatory that the trial court treble those
damages.

~

The

trial-~, court~

s failure to treble

the.-Oamag~s,

was error and judgment· should be entered for Snows for
treble the amount of damages found by the trial court.
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POINT IV. THE PROVISION IN THE LEASE AND OPTION TO
PURCHASE BY WHICH THE PARTIES AGREED tHAT
THE DEFAULTING PARTY WOULD PAY THE ExPE-NSES
OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEE, IS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Lease agreement
between the parties provides that:

When the contract between parties provides that the
defaulting partyshall pay all costs and expenses including
a _reasonable attorney's _fee- incurred in enforcing the agreement ,- that- -clause is _enforceable.__ _and the defaulting -party is
responsible -for all expenses incurred.

Jones

Y.

_Hinkle, 611

P.2d 7JT-(Ut. 1980); Jensen--v. Manila- Corporation of the Church
of Jesus Chri-s t of- Latter- :Day Saints, 565 P. 2d 63 (Ut.
1977).

This __ rule_ is based -on the premise_ that_ the bargain

between--the partie-s includes the payment of attorneys' fees
by the defaulting party, and the failure of the Court to
enforce that provision would result in the Court rewriting
the contract.

Jensen v. Manila Corporation of the Church

of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, at 65.

This Court has

also recently adopted the general rule that:
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[A] provision for payment of attorney's fees in a
contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if
the action is brought to enforce the contract ....
Mana ement Servi·ces Cor oration v. Develo ment
Associat~s,
7 P.
06 Ut. 19 0
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer To Lease Agreement
between the parties provided that if a party failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement, then
the defaulting party·would pay all costs of enforcing agreement, including,a reasonable attorney's fee.
court found that Hackfords

had.failed~to

The trial

comply with the

terms=-and"=conditions-,of- the,,:agreement -between- the· parties
when Hackfords refused to convey the property to Snows.
Snows were required to obtain legal counsel to enforce their
rights

-arising~

out __ o£ the _agreement and to _defend the _-appeal

brought··by: Hackfords~ ~:_The- testimony=-showed:::--that:Snows-chadincurr.ed-=~~~ttorn,eys ~ .:..c:f ee~ith~he lawJirm~-of --~Beas-lin ;~~

Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, and with-the-law firm.of McKeachnie
&

Allred-, in enforcing the terms- of the.-contract _between=the

parties. (T. 88-93)- There was no evidence-indicating that
Snows tlid not in6ur those
fees were not reasonable.

legal~fees

or

that~hose

legal

Since the contract between the

parties provided that the defaulting party was to pay all
costs, including a reasonable attorneys' fee incurred by the
prevailing party, the trial court erred in ruling that each
party was to bear _its own cost and attorneys' fees.

The
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case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of the attorneys' fee incurred by
Snows for the trial and the appeal of this case.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court

corre~tly

held that the- lease and the

option to purchase had not been cancelled at the time the
Snows exercised the option to purchase.

Since the Snows had

properly exercised their option to purchase, had occupied
and -used- the· property for

-three~years; '""and--made~~impr-ovements

thereon, the trial court acted properly in granting specific
performance.

.To have failed _to grant specific performance _

in this factual setting would have been an abuse of discretion. The trial court did err when it failed to treble
the damages awarded to Snows and when it refused to award
Snows their costs and attorney fees.
Snows respectfully request-that-the trial- court's
decree of_ specific performance-.:.be sustained and that the
case be remanded-with __ instructions to
incurred -by' Snows- as a result of the
Hackfords,

~-and-

treble~the __ damages-

self-help-~

-

actions-- of - -

to award-= Snows~- a reasonable -attorneys' -fee -

incurred at trial and on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this J<{tl. day of December,

1980.

clrkB. Alred
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.

53 South 200 East
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone --=-==--At tornevf:=-:f;,;~~~i~l\~~~~~:.:~---:_-
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